This paper analyzes a preference revelation game in the student optimal deferred acceptance algorithm in a college admission problem. We assume that each college's true preferences are known publicly and analyze the strategic behavior of students. We show the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium in the preference revelation game by providing a simple algorithm that finds it. In particular, (i) the equilibrium outcome by our algorithm is the same matching as in the efficiently-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm (Kesten, 2010) and (ii) in a one-to-one matching market, it coincides with the student-optimal vNM stable matching (Ehlers (2007) and Wako (2010)). We also show that (i) when a strict core allocation in a housing market derived from a college admission market exists, it can be supported by a strictly strong Nash equilibrium and (ii) there may not exist a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the college optimal deferred acceptance algorithm.
Introduction
Since the seminal paper of Gale and Shapley (1962) , college admission problems have been extensively analyzed by many researchers. 1 Stability is the main solution concept used in college admission problems. In a stable matching, each agent cannot be strictly better off by rejecting some his current partner and no pair of a student and a college strictly prefers each other over their current partner. Gale and Shapley (1962) showed the existence of a stable matching by the well-known deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm. Especially, the following student optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (SODA) is practically used and important.
• Step 0: Each student proposes to his best college. Each college c with a capacity q c accepts the top q c 's students who propose to c at step 1 and rejects the rest. Each student tentatively matches with the college that accepts him.
•
Step k(≥ 1): Each student that has been rejected at step k − 1 proposes to his best college that has never rejected him. Each college c with a capacity q c accepts the top q c 's students from his tentative match and the students who propose to c at this step. Each student tentatively matches with the college that accepts him.
• The algorithm terminates when no rejections are issued. Gale and Shapley (1962) also showed that the final matching is student-optimal in the sense that all students weakly prefer it to any other stable matchings. In a centralized market, a matchmaker needs to collect preferences of the participants in order to find a stable matching by the SODA. Then, the SODA defines a preference revelation game for students and colleges as follows:
• Each student reports preferences over colleges and each college reports preferences over students to the matchmaker.
• The matchmaker finds a stable matching by the SODA for the reported preferences. Each student is assigned to a college according to the stable matching.
In this paper, we assume that each college's true preferences are known publicly and analyze the strategic behavior of students in the above game. 2 In particular, we consider the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium in which each group of students cannot make all members in the group weakly better off and some members in the group strictly better off by changing their strategies.
There are many previous studies on the preference revelation game of students under the SODA. Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) showed that the SODA satisfies strategy-proofness. That is, reporting true preferences is a dominant strategy for each student. This result was extended to more general models by Abdulkadiroglu (2005) and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) . Dubins and Freedman (1981) also showed that the SODA satisfies group strategy-proofness. That is, no group of students can make each of its members strictly better off by jointly misreporting their preferences. This result was extended to more general models by Martinez, et al. (2004) and Hatfield and Kojima (2009) . Sotomayor (2008) analyzed the property of Nash equilibrium outcomes in the SODA. She showed that a Nash equilibrium outcome in the SODA may not be stable with respect to true preferences. Then, she introduced the notion of a Nash equilibrium in a strong sense and showed that any stable matching rule implements the set of stable matchings in Nash equilibria in the strong sense. In a constrained school problem, Haeringer and Klijn (2009) provided a necessary and sufficient condition under which every Nash equilibrium outcome is stable with respect to true preferences. 3 Group strategy-proofness directly implies that the truth-telling strategy profile is a strong Nash equilibrium under the SODA. However, Dubins and Freedman (1981) showed that if a group of students manipulates their true preferences, it may be possible that each student in the group can be weakly better off and some students in the group can be strictly better off. That is, the truth-telling strategy profile may not be a strictly strong Nash equilibrium. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) also discussed this point in Section 4.3.1
The next natural question is whether a strictly strong Nash equilibrium exists under the SODA. We show the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium by providing a simple algorithm that finds it. Our algorithm is described as follows. Let M 0 = (I, C, ≽ I , ≽ C , q) be the original market where I is a set of students, C is a set of colleges, ≽ I is the preference profile of students, ≽ C is the preference profile of colleges and q is the profile of each college's quota.
• Step 0: Find the student optimal stable matching µ 0 in the market M 0 by the SODA. Next, identify the set of the last proposers L 0 in the SODA. If
by removing L 0 from M 0 and proceed to the next step.
Step k(≥ 1): Find the student optimal stable matching µ k in the market M k 3 Their paper also clarified the property of Nash equilibrium outcomes in the top trading cycle algorithm.
by the SODA. Next, identify the set of the last proposers
by removing L k from M k and proceed to the next step.
This algorithm terminates in a finite step k * , because the set of the last proposers is nonempty for each step. Each iteration yields matchings µ 0 , .
This paper shows that the strategy profile (≽ * i ) i∈I is a strictly strong Nash equilibrium.
We also clarify the property of the equilibrium outcome by our algorithm. Kesten (2010) provided an algorithm called the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (EADA) that finds a Pareto efficient matching for students in which all students weakly prefer it to the student optimal stable matching. This algorithm is based on the elimination of the interrupting pair in the SODA. Say that a pair of a student and a college (i, c) is an interrupting pair in the SODA if (i) i is accepted by c at some step t and (ii) i is rejected by c at some step t ′ > t, and (iii) there exists j ̸ = i such that j is rejected by c for some step k ∈ {t, . . . , t ′ − 1}. Then, the EADA is defined as follows.
• Step 0: Find the student optimal stable matching µ 0 in the market M 0 by the SODA. When the set of interrupting pairs under the SODA is empty, then the algorithm terminates and µ 0 is the final matching. Otherwise, identify the latest interrupting pair (i, c) and define a new preference profile ≽ 1 I by eliminating c from ≽ i . Set M 1 = (I, C, ≽ 1 I , ≽ C , q) and proceed to the next step.
• Step k(≥ 1): Find the student optimal stable matching µ k in the market M k by the SODA. When the set of interrupting pairs under the SODA is empty, then the algorithm terminates and µ k is the final matching. Otherwise, identify the latest interrupting pair (i, c) and define a new preference profile
, ≽ C , q) and proceed to the next step.
We show that the equilibrium outcome by our algorithm is the same matching as in the EADA. For a matchmaker, identifying the set of the last proposers is more . . . , µ0(i) , i represents the strict preferences over the colleges that satisfies (i) the set of i's acceptable colleges is given by {µ k (i), µ k−1 (i), . . . , µ0(i)} ∩ C and (ii) student i weakly prefers µ k ′ +1 (i) to µ k ′ (i) under ≽ easy task than identifying the set of interrupting pairs. So, this paper strengthens the result of Kesten (2010) by (i) providing a simple algorithm that finds the same outcome, and (ii) showing that it can be always supported by a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the SODA.
In a one-to-one matching market, the equilibrium outcome by our algorithm is related to the vNM stable matching. The vNM stable set is the solution concept proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) for cooperative games. 5 Ehlers (2007) first analyzed the property of the vNM stable sets in marriage markets. He showed that if a vNM stable set exists, it is a maximal distributive lattice that contains the set of stable matchings. This result implies that if a vNM stable set exists, there exists a man (or woman)-optimal vNM stable matching in the sense that all men (or women) weakly prefer it to any other matchings in the vNM stable set. Wako (2010) showed the existence and the uniqueness of the set of vNM stable matchings by providing a polynomial time algorithm that finds the man-optimal vNM stable matching and the woman-optimal vNM stable matching. This paper shows that in a one-to-one matching market, the equilibrium outcome by our algorithm coincides with the student-optimal vNM stable matching. The algorithm provided by Wako (2010) is based on the elimination of the W (orM )-rotations from the preference list. For a matchmaker, identifying the set of the last proposers is more easy task than identifying the rotations. So, this paper also strengthens the results of Ehlers (2007) and Wako (2010) by (i) providing a simple algorithm that finds the same outcome, and (ii) showing that it can be always supported by a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the SODA.
We also discuss a relation between a strictly strong Nash equilibrium and a strict core allocation of a housing market (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) . For each college admission market and stable matching of this market, we can construct a housing market where the set of players is students who match with a college in the stable matching and each player's initial endowment is his partner in the stable matching. We show that if a strict core allocation exists in the corresponding housing market, then it can be supported by a strictly strong Nash equilibrium in the SODA. Gale and Sotomayor (1985) showed that a strong Nash equilibrium always exists under any stable matching mechanism. Unfortunately, if we consider the strictly strong Nash equilibrium, this result does not hold and we can show that a strictly strong Nash equilibrium may not exist under the college optimal deferred acceptance algorithm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 provides the algorithm that finds a strictly strong Nash equilibrium and clarifies the property of the equilibrium outcome by the algorithm. Section 4 discusses the relation between a strictly strong Nash equilibrium and a strict core. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
Preliminaries
A college admission market is given by a tuple (I, C, ≽ I , ≽ C , q). I is a finite set of students and C is a finite set of colleges. Each student i has strict preferences ≽ i over C ∪ {i}. ≽ I = (≽ i ) i∈I is the preference profile of students. For each i ∈ I and c ∈ C, c is acceptable for i if c ≻ i i. Each college c has strict preferences ≽ c over 2 I . ≽ C = (≽ c ) c∈C is the preference profile of colleges. For each college c, q c is the quota of c and q = (q c ) c∈C . We assume that each college c's preferences satisfy responsiveness with quota q c (Roth, 1985) . is the top min {q c , |{i ∈ S|i ≻ c ∅|} acceptable students which belong to S because the college c's preferences are responsive with quota q c . We often write a market
We say that a function from I into C ∪ I is a matching if |µ −1 (c)| ≤ q c for all c ∈ C. Note that for each i ∈ I, µ(i) is i's partner in the matching µ and µ(i) = i means that i is unmatched at µ. We often represent a matching in the following way.
This means that c 1 matches with i 1 , c 2 matches with i 2 and i 4 , c 3 matches with i 3 , and i 5 is unmatched. 6 We say that a matching µ is individually rational for students if µ(i) ≽ i i for all i ∈ I. A matching µ is individually rational for colleges if for all c ∈ C and for all i ∈ µ −1 (c),
. Given a matching µ, we say that it is blocked by (i, c) ∈ I × C if 6 The formal description of this matching is given by the following function µ; µ(i1) = c1, 
We say that a matching µ is stable if it is individually rational and is not blocked.
We next introduce a formal description of the SODA.
Step 0: Each student proposes to his best acceptable college. For each c ∈ C, A 0 c is the set of students that propose to c at step 0. Each college c accepts Ch c (A 0 c ) and
c is c's tentative match at step 0.
Step k(k ≥ 1): For each student i that has been rejected at step k − 1, (i) if i has been rejected by all acceptable colleges up to step k − 1, then i proposes to i and this offer is always accepted, and (ii) otherwise, i proposes to his best acceptable college that has never rejected him. For each c ∈ C, A k c is the set of students that propose to c at step k. Then, each college c accepts
; ≽ c ). We say that T k c is college c's tentative match at step t.
• The algorithm terminates when no rejections are issued.
The algorithm always terminates in a finite number of steps. Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that the final matching (the tentative matching at the last step) is stable. Given a market M = (≽ I , ≽ C , q), let DA(M ) be the stable matching produced by the SODA. Gale and Shapley (1962) also showed that the final matching is student-optimal in the sense that all students weakly prefer it to any other stable matchings. That is, for any stable matching
Strictly strong Nash equilibrium under SODA
In this subsection, we introduce a preference revelation game under the SODA and the notion of the strictly strong Nash equilibrium.
Given a market (I, C,
as follows. The set of players is I. For each student i, D i (C) is the set of preferences over C ∪ {i} and is the set of i's strategies. Given a strategy profile ≽ ′ I , the outcome of this game is determined by DA(≽ ′ I , ≽ C , q). Each student i evaluates the outcome according to his true preferences ≽ i .
Next, we introduce the equilibrium concepts to the strategic game. We say that a nonempty subset of students S ⊆ I is a coalition. For each coalition S, D S (C) = × i∈S D i (C) is the set of S's joint strategies. Given a strategy profile ≽ * I ∈ D I (C), we say that a coalition S has a strong deviation at ≽ * I if there exists
In the above definition, when ν(i) ≻ i µ(i) holds for all i ∈ S, we say that S has a deviation at ≽ * I . We say that a strategy profile ≽ * I is a (strictly) strong Nash equilibrium if for each coalition S, S does not have any (strong) deviation at ≽ * I . The result of Hatfield and Kojima (2009) implies that for each student to report true preferences is always a strong Nash equilibrium. However, it may not be a strictly strong Nash equilibrium. The following simple example given by Hatfield and Kojima (2009) shows this fact.
. Each student's preferences and college's preferences are given by as follows:
Then, the student optimal stable matching µ in this market is given by:
Consider the following matching ν.
Then, all students weakly prefer ν to µ, and the students i 1 , i 3 strictly prefer ν to µ. Consider the following strategy:
Then, DA(≽ ′
I , ≽ C , q) = ν holds and I has a strong deviation at ≽ I .
The reason that the truth-telling strategy profile is not a strictly strong Nash equilibrium is that the student optimal stable matching may not be Pareto efficient for students with respect to true preferences. Formally, an individually rational matching µ is Pareto efficient for students with respect to ≽ I if there exists no individually rational matching ν such that Kesten (2010) showed that the extent of the welfare loss due to the SODA can be troublingly large in the sense that for any given set colleges, one can find situations in which every student is assigned to either his last choice or his next to last choice under the SODA. Ergin (2002) showed that ≽ C satisfies his acyclicity condition if and only if for all
is Pareto efficient for students with respect to ≽ ′ I . His theorem also implies that if ≽ C satisfies his acyclicity condition, then the truth-telling strategy profile is a strictly strong Nash equilibrium. 7 Our model does not assume this condition and we cannot apply his result.
Main result
In this section, we introduce the algorithm that finds a strictly strong Nash equilibrium and clarified the property of the equilibrium outcome.
As we saw the previous section, if there exists a strictly strong Nash equilibrium, then the corresponding outcome must be Pareto efficient for students. Gale and Sotomayor (1985) showed that any stable matching is supported by a Nash equilibrium in the SODA. 8 This result does not hold if we consider a Pareto efficient matching for students. The following example illustrates that there may exist a Pareto efficient matching for students that is not supported by a Nash equilibrium. Hence, it is not so easy to find a strictly strong Nash equilibrium.
Example 2. Let
We assume that q c 1 = 1, q c 2 = 2 and q c 3 = 1. Each student's preferences are given by as follows:
Each college's preferences are given by as follows:
In this market, the student optimal stable matching is given by:
Note that this matching is the unique stable matching in this market. The following matching µ is Pareto efficient for students. 
is give by:
We now provide a formal description of the algorithm. In order to define the algorithm, we need to introduce some notations. Let M = (I, C, ≽ I , ≽ C , q) be a market. For each I ′ ⊆ I and c ∈ C, let ≽ c | I ′ be the restriction of ≽ c to 2 I ′ ; that is, ≽ c | I ′ is the strict preferences over 2 I ′ such that for any S,
c∈C be the profile of the restricted preferences. Then, the algorithm is defined as follows.
and proceed to the next step.
This algorithm terminates in finite steps because L k ̸ = ∅ for every step k ≥ 0 and I is a finite set. Given a market (I, C, ≽ I , ≽ C , q), the termination of the algorithm yields a strategy profile
Then, the following theorem shows that A(I, C, ≽ I , ≽ C , q) is a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the SODA.
The following example illustrates how this algorithm works in the market in Example 2. Step 1: M 1 is give by:
where q c 1 = 1, q c 2 = 2 and q c 3 = 1. DA(M 1 ) = µ 1 is given by:
The set of the last proposers in DA(M 1 ) is given by L 1 = {i 2 } and we have that
: c 2 , i 2 and remove i 2 from the market.
Step 2: M 2 is as follows.
where q c 1 = 1, q c 2 = 2 and q c 3 = 1. The set of the last proposers in DA(M 2 ) is given by L 2 = {i 1 , i 3 , i 4 } and the algorithm terminates. DA(M 2 ) = µ 2 is given by:
is defined as follows:
Theorem 1 shows that the preference profile ≽ *
I is a strictly strong Nash equilibrium. Note that the equilibrium matching is given by:
We next show that the equilibrium outcome by our algorithm coincides with the outcome produced by the EADA. The formal description of the EADA is given by as follows. Given a market M = (≽ I , ≽ C , q), we say that a pair of a student and a college (i, c) is an interrupting pair in DA(M ) if (i) i is accepted by c at some step t, (ii) i is rejected by c at some step t ′ > t, and there exists j ̸ = i such that j is rejected by c for some k ∈ {t, . . . .t ′ − 1}. We say that (i, c) is the latest interrupting pair in DA(M ) if it is an interrupting pair in DA(M ) and there exists no interrupting pair (i ′ , c ′ ) such that i ′ is rejected by c ′ at step t ′ > t where t is the step in which i is rejected by c. Then, the EADA is defined as follows.
• Step 0: Let DA(M 0 ) = µ 0 . If there exists no interrupting pair in DA(M 0 ), then the algorithm terminates and the final matching is given by µ 0 . Otherwise, identify the latest interrupting pair (i, c) in DA(M 0 ) and define
• 
, ≽ C , q) and proceed to the next step. Kesten (2010) showed that for each market M = (≽ I , ≽ C , q), the EADA produces a matching µ * that satisfies (i) Pareto efficiency for students and (ii) µ * (i) ≽ i DA(M )(i) for all i ∈ I. We write the final matching µ * by EADA (≽ I , ≽ C , q) . Then, we have the following theorem. Then, we have the following theorem which states that
Theorem 2. For each market (≽
I , ≽ C , q), DA(A(≽ I , ≽ C , q), ≽ C , q) = EADA(≽ I , ≽ C , q). Hence, EADA(≽ I , ≽ C ,
q) can be always supported by a strict Nash equilibrium in the SODA.
We next consider a one-to-one matching market; that is, (≽ I , ≽ C , q) with q c = 1 for all c ∈ C. We will show that the equilibrium outcome by our algorithm coincides with the vNM student-optimal stable matching. The vNM stable set is defined as follows. Let µ and ν be individually rational matchings in (I, C, ≽ I , ≽ C , q). We say that µ dominates ν if there exists (i, c) ∈ I × C such that (i) c ≻ i ν(i) and i ≻ c ν −1 (c), and (ii) µ(i) = c. Let V be a subset of individually rational matchings. We say that V is vNM stable set if it satisfies the following 2 properties:
• For each µ, ν ∈ V , µ does not dominates ν (Internal stability).
• For each individually rational matching ν with ν / ∈ V , there exists µ ∈ V such that µ dominates ν (External stability).
The internal stability means that if an individually rational matching is in the vNM set, it is not dominated by any other matchings in the vNM set. The external stability means if an individually rational matching is not in the vNM set, it is dominated by a matching in the vNM set.
By the results of Ehlers (2007) and Wako (2010), we have that (i) there exists a vNM stable set V , (ii) V is uniquely determined; that is, for any V, V ′ where V and V ′ are vNM stable set, V = V ′ holds and (iii) there exists the student-optimal vNM stable matching; that is, there exists µ ∈ V such that µ(i) ≽ i ν(i) for all i ∈ I and for all ν ∈ V . 9 For each one-to-one matching market (I, C, ≽ I , ≽ C , q), we write the student optimal vNM stable matching by V (I, C, ≽ I , ≽ C , q). Then, we have the following result.
Theorem 3. Consider a one-to-one matching market
and hence the student-optimal vNM stable matching can be always supported by a strictly strong Nash equilibrium in the SODA.
Strict core and strictly strong Nash equilibrium
In this section, we construct a housing market from a college admission market and show that when a strict core allocation in the corresponding housing market exists, then it can be supported by a strictly strong Nash equilibrium.
Let (I, C, ≽ I , ≽ C , q) be a market and µ be a stable matching in this market. Let I * be the set of students who match with a college in µ. That is, I * = {i ∈ I|µ(i) ∈ C}. We can construct a housing market (I * , ≥ I * , µ) where the set of players is I * and each player i's initial endowment is µ(i) as follows. For each i ∈ I * , ≥ i is a preference relation over I * that satisfies the following two conditions: (i) for any j ∈ I * , if i is unacceptable for µ(j), then i > i j, and (ii) for any j, j ′ ∈ I * where i is acceptable for µ(j) and µ(j ′ ), j ≥ i j ′ if and only if µ(j) ≽ i µ(j ′ ). Condition (i) says that if i is unacceptable for j's college, then i strictly prefers his initial endowment to j's initial endowment in ≥ i . 10 Condition (ii) says that if i is acceptable for j and j ′ 's colleges, then i weakly prefers j to j ′ in ≥ i if and only if i weakly prefers µ(j) to µ(j ′ ) in his original preferences ≽ i .
We say that a bijection x : I * → I * is an allocation. For each allocation x, we can define a matching µ x as follows: If i ∈ I * and x(i) = j, then µ x (i) = µ(j) and if i / ∈ I * , then µ x (i) = i. Note that for each allocation x ′ in the market (I * , ≥ I * , µ), the corresponding matching µ x ′ satisfies the following property: |µ x ′ (i)| = |µ(i)| for all i ∈ I and |µ −1 x ′ (c)| = |µ −1 (c)| for all c ∈ C. 11 We also note that by the construction of ≥ i , for any allocation
An allocation x is a strict core allocation if there exist no coalition S ⊆ I * and no allocation x ′ such that (i) x ′ (i) ≥ i x(i) for all i ∈ S and x ′ (i) > i x(i) for some i ∈ S and (ii) x ′ (S) = S. By the results of Shapley and Scarf (1974) and Roth and Postlewaite (1977) , it is well known fact that if ≥ i is strict for all i ∈ I * , then a strict core allocation exists and otherwise, a strict core allocation may not exist. In our model, if we consider a marriage market; that is, q c ≤ 1 for all c ∈ C, then we can regard ≥ i as strict preferences and hence a strict core allocation exists. However, in general, a strict core allocation may not exist. For example, a strict core allocation does not exist in the market given in Example 2. Quint and Wako (2004) provided a polynomial time algorithm to find a strict core allocation or report that a strict core is empty for any given housing market. By applying their algorithm to (I * , ≥ I * , µ), if we can find a strict core allocation in the market (I * , ≥ I * , µ), then we can easily construct a strictly strong Nash equilibrium and the following theorem illustrates this fact. 
Then, ≽ * I is a strictly strong Nash equilibrium in the strategic game
We finally provide some remarks on this result. Wako (2010) showed that the strict core allocation from the student optimal stable matching may not be the student optimal vNM stable matching. This paper showed the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium in the SODA. The next natural question is whether a strictly strong Nash equilibrium exists under the college optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (CODA). Unfortunately, there may not exist a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the CODA. In fact, when a student optimal stable matching is not Pareto efficient for students, there does not exist a strictly strong Nash equilibrium, because the following two facts hold:
Remark 1. The equilibrium outcome given in the algorithm by Section 3 may not be a strict core allocation from the student optimal stable matching, even if it exists. In fact, Example 5.2 in

Remark 2. Let (I, C, ≽ I , ≽ C , q) be a market, µ be a stable matching in this market and (I * , ≥ I * , µ) be the corresponding housing market. Let x be a Pareto efficient allocation in (I * , ≥ I * , µ). That is, there exists no allocation
• Roth (1984) showed that every Nash equilibrium outcome under the CODA is stable with respect to true preferences when each college reports true preferences.
• Any strictly strong Nash equilibrium outcomes must be Pareto efficient for students under the CODA.
Strictly strong Nash equilibrium outcome
This paper provided two algorithms to construct a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the SODA. In both construction, the equilibrium outcome satisfies the following properties: (i) it is Pareto efficient for students and (ii) all students weakly prefer it to some stable matching. Hence, one may expect that if there exists a strictly strong Nash equilibrium, then the equilibrium outcome satisfies these two properties. However, the following example given by Haeringer and Klijn (2009) shows that this conjecture is not true. 
The unique stable matching in this market is given by:
Consider the preference profile:
: c 3 , c 1 , i 3 . Then, the outcome is given by:
Note that c 3 ≻ i 2 c 2 holds. However, one can easily confirm that ≽ ′ I is a strictly strong Nash equilibrium.
Appendix Basic lemmas
In this subsection, we introduce basic 5 lemmas to prove Theorem 1, 2 and 4.
We first provide a useful characterization of a stable matching. Let (I, C, ≽ I , ≽ C , q) be a market. Given a matching µ and c ∈ C, define A c (µ, ≽ I ) = {i ∈ I|c ≽ i µ(i)}, which is the set of students who weakly prefer c to his current assignment. If an individually rational matching µ is stable, then we have that (c) and c can block the matching µ). Conversely, if an individually rational matching µ satisfies Ch c (A c (µ, ≽ I ); ≽ c ) = µ −1 (c) for all c ∈ C, then there exists no blocking pair in the matching µ and hence it is stable. Thus, we have the following fact.
Fact 1. Let µ be an individually rational matching in the market (≽ I , ≽ C , q). Then, µ is stable if and only if
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005)'s result (Theorem 6) implies the following lemma which states that when some students are removed from a market, the rest students are never worse off under the student optimal stable matching.
Lemma 1 (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005) .
The next lemma is an extension of a kind of the rural hospital theorem. The rural hospital theorem says that if student i is unmatched in some stable matching, then i is unmatched in all stable matchings, and each college has the same number of students in all stable matchings. 12 The following lemma states that the rural hospital theorem also holds in the set of individually rational matchings in which 12 Alkan (2002) and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) showed that this result holds in more general models. Roth (1986) showed that if a college has a vacant seat in some stable matching, it's partner is the same in all stable matchings. all students weakly prefer it to a stable matching. To show this lemma, we need to introduce the following notation: For each student i ∈ I and matching µ, define |µ(i)| as follows:
Lemma 2. Let M = (I, C, ≽ I , ≽ C , q) be a market and µ be a stable matching in this market. Consider an individually rational matching ν such that
Proof.
(1): Pick any c ∈ C and i ∈ ν −1 (c).
(2): Note that the responsiveness implies the following property; for any A,
The next lemma provides a property related to the last proposers under the SODA and says that given a student optimal stable matching, if a student i strictly prefers the last proposer j's college to his college, then student i is unacceptable for j's college.
Then, we have that for any i
has accepted some agent j with j ∈ L at step t * and (ii) c has never rejected any students at step t * . This implies that the college c has a vacant seat at its tentative match at step t * − 1. Hence, for any t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t * − 1}, the college c has a vacant seat at its tentative match at step t under DA(M ). That is, |T c t | < q c holds for each t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t * − 1}. By c ≻ i µ(i), the student i has been rejected by c at some step t < t * under DA(M ). The fact that the college c has a vacant seat at step t implies that i is unacceptable for c. So, we have that ∅ ≻ c i.
The next two lemmas provide properties related to the strategic game under the SODA. The following lemma is an extension of the result of Roth (1982) and says that a coalition S has a strong deviation at some strategy profile if and only if S has a strong deviation by a simple strategy. 
So, this lemma holds.
We next introduce the notion of c-bottom strategy and its important property. For each ≽ ′ i ∈ D i (C) and c ∈ C ∪ {i}, U (c, ≽ ′ i ) be the set of alternatives which i weakly prefers to c under
Property (i) says that c is acceptable in both ≽ ′ i and ≽ c i , (ii) says that if i weakly prefers c ′ to c in ≽ c i , he also weakly prefers c ′ to c in ≽ ′ i and (iii) means that c is the worst acceptable college in ≽ c i , when c ∈ C. Throughout, we focus on µ(i)-bottom strategy relative to true preferences, where µ is a stable matching in the original market (I, C, ≽ I , ≽ C , q). The following lemma states that given a µ(i)-bottom strategy profile relative to true preferences, for each coalition S, if each member of S can make weakly better off by changing their strategies, all students weakly prefer the resulting matching ν to µ in their true preferences and hence ν has a rural hospital theorem property. 
Proof. (i): We first show the following claim.
Proof. Note that by the construction of ≽ * I , µ is also stable in (
We now show that 
Proof of Theorem 1
Let M = (I, C, ≽ I , ≽ C , q) be a market and A(M ) =≽ * I . We assume that (i) the algorithm A(M ) terminates at step k * ≥ 0 and (ii) L k is removed at step
be the market at step k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k * } and DA(M k ) = µ k be the matching produced at step k ∈ {0, 1, . . . k * }. We first show the following claim. Claim 2. Let k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k * } and i ∈ I k . Then, we have that
Proof. (
Hence, by Lemma 3, we have that ∅ ≻ c i.
Note that (i) of Claim 1 and the construction ≽ * i directly imply the following fact.
Fact 2. For each i
This property and Claim 1 directly imply the following fact.
Fact 3. For each k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k * } and each i ∈ I k , the followings hold.
The following claim shows that the function µ * k is an individually rational matching in the original market for each k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k * }.
Proof. We first show that for each k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k * }, µ * k is a matching. We show this claim by the induction. By the definition, µ * 0 = µ 0 holds. Because µ 0 is the student optimal stable matching in the original market (I, C, ≽ I , ≽ C , q), µ * 0 is a matching. Suppose that µ * k ′ is a matching for some k ′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k * − 1}. We will show that µ * k ′ +1 is a matching. Suppose that µ * k ′ +1 is not a matching. Then, there exists c ∈ C such that |µ * −1
. By the induction hypothesis, we have that µ * −1 
Hence, µ * k ′ +1 is a matching. Finally, we show that µ * k is individually rational for each k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k * }. µ * k is obviously individually rational for students for each k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k * }. Suppose that µ * k ′ is not individually rational for colleges for some k ′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k * }. Then, there exists c ∈ C and j ∈ µ * −1 k ′ (c) such that ∅ ≻ c j. By the definition, µ * k ′ (j) = µ k ′′ (j) = c for some k ′′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k ′ }. This implies that j ∈ µ 
We now show this claim by the induction. We first show that S + ∩ L 0 = ∅. Suppose that for some k ′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k * − 1}, S + ∩ L l = ∅ holds for each l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k ′ }. We will show that S + ∩ L k ′ +1 = ∅. We first show the following claim.
Claim 4. The following three statements hold.
Proof. (i): Suppose that ν(i)
≻ i µ * k * (i) for some i ∈ L 0 ∪ L 1 ∪ . . . ∪ L k ′ .
Because ν(i) is unacceptable in ≽ *
i , we must have that i ∈ S + . However, this contradicts the induction hypothesis.
( 
